Appropriations, Ambition, and the Madisonian Constitution

Published by American Institute for Economic Research.

This insulation from both Congress and the President was backed by the unique funding mechanism designed for the CFPB. While nominally identified as a “Bureau” of the Federal Reserve, the CFPB was not subject to annual appropriations by Congress, as is, say, the Federal Trade Commission. Instead, the CFPB is entitled to bypass Congress’s annual appropriations process and draw funds directly from the Federal Reserve Board, subject to a statutory percentage-based cap (which the CFPB has never approached) based on the Fed’s total annual operating expenses.[13]

[13] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1017(a)(1). A separate issue, not discussed here, is the provision that the transfer be funded by “earnings” of the Federal Reserve Board. It has been argued that for several years the Federal Reserve has not had “earnings” but has instead has suffered losses. See Paul H. Kupiec and Alex J. Pollock, LawandLiberty.org, Can the Fed Fund the CFPB? (June 5, 2024), https://lawliberty.org/can-the-fed-fund-the-cfpb/; Brian Johnson, Examining the New Debate on CFPB Funding, Patomak.com (July 9, 2024), https://patomak.com/2024/07/09/examining-the-new-debate-on-cfpb-funding/.

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How Congress Could Take Back Control of Money From an Inflationary Fed