Letter: The Fed Is Not a 'Market Maker of Last Resort

A shortened version of the letter was published in The Wall Street Journal.

James Mackintosh suggests that central banks, including the Federal Reserve, made the switch in financial crises from being "the lender of last resort" to "also being market makers of last resort" (Central Banks Are Stuck in a Cycle of Crises," August 17). It is true that they made a momentous switch, but that was not it. The Fed and the others became not market makers, but leveraged buy and hold investors of last resort, a completely different thing. A market maker is constantly buying and selling. The Fed was only buying, not selling, in order to push up the price of the securities and to drive down their yields. A market maker is in it to make money on the bid-asked spread; the Fed created giant leveraged naked long positions that might, and then did, lose vast amounts of money. The Fed generated operating losses of more than $200 billion and in addition mark-to-market losses of more than $800 billion, for an economic loss of more than $1 trillion. Being a leveraged buy and hold investor of last resort can be an expensive proposition.

ALEX J. POLLOCK
Mises Institute
Lake Forest, Ill.

Letter: The Fed’s seigniorage is also under attack

Published in the Financial Times.

Ignazio Angeloni writes that “tokenised deposits look more promising” than stablecoins (“Stablecoins or tokenised deposits? The jury’s out”, Letters, July 31).

If a tokenised deposit can stay in circulation, making payments for an indefinitely large series of transactions, it has become the functional equivalent of paper currency issued by private banks. This was historically a key business of private banks but got monopolised by central banks — in the US case, by the Federal Reserve. Perhaps its monopoly will be broken?

Stablecoins are also competitors with the Federal Reserve, especially competing with the Fed’s $100 bills used around the world for informal (or illegal) payments.

Thus both banks with tokenised deposits and stablecoin issuers become competitors to the Fed.

Issuing currency — via seigniorage — is by far the most profitable activity of central banks, generating profits for the Fed of about $88bn a year at current interest rates. How much of this profit could be captured by private issuers as the Fed’s circulating currency monopoly faces competition?

What Currency Would Americans Choose?

In which our columnist questions his readers.

Published in The New York Sun.

In the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, let us ask whether the rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” should include the right to use the money of your and your counterparties’ own choice. Or should you be forced to use the paper dollars which the Federal Reserve prints?

Under present circumstances one is forced to use what we call Federal Reserve Notes, because the government grants a complete monopoly in money to the Fed. We are so accustomed to this situation that we are likely to take it for granted. Yet it is not necessary that the Fed have the power to print as much money as it wants to print.

Or to lend as much as it wants to the government to spend. Or to create perpetual inflation, impose a constant inflation tax on the people without any approval by the Congress, and constantly depreciate the money, savings, and wages to finance the government’s deficits.

The philosopher-economist, Friedrich Hayek, put the question in his “Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation.” That was issued in 1976, two years after Hayek won the Nobel Prize in Economics. “Why,” Hayek asked, “should we not let people choose freely what money they want to use?” He understood that the Treasury and the Fed would hate this question, but a free people ought to take it up.

Hayek suggested that the key problem is not that the Federal Reserve gets to issue money, but that it gets a monopoly in doing so. He proposed that this monopoly be taken away, so that the Fed could still issue money, but the money it creates would have to compete with other money for the public’s confidence.

In Hayek’s proposed world, central banks would be disciplined by this competition in currency. “There could be no more effective check against the abuse of money by the government than if people were free to refuse any money they distrusted and to prefer money in which they had confidence.” Have governments abused their money power? Without doubt.

Hayek warned that nearly all governments “used their exclusive power to issue money in order to defraud and plunder the people.” His thoughts are congenial to those who want cryptocurrencies to compete with Federal Reserve notes. In 2025, Congress enacted with bipartisan majorities the “Genius Act,” favorable to the cryptocurrency called stablecoins.

It would be newsworthy if stablecoins were an example of Hayekian choice in currency, but unfortunately, they are not. Because stablecoins are tied one-for-one by definition and now by law to Federal Reserve dollars, when the Fed is depreciating your paper dollars, it is equally depreciating your stablecoins.

However, there have been historical examples of true parallel currencies in America. The most pertinent case was during the Civil War, when as described by Joseph Salerno of the Mises Institute, pure paper Treasury greenbacks “swiftly became the domestic currency… but gold continued as a parallel currency in the East, because of its use in foreign trade.”

This precedent is consistent with Hayek’s proposal to create competition for central bank paper currencies, because Hayek was really thinking about gold. That the best monetary competition would come from gold is something about Hayek’s essay often not understood.

When the essay was published in 1976, it had been only two years since the United States government had at long last rescinded its oppressive 1933 law making it a criminal offense to own any gold to protect yourself against government monetary depreciation. This is a good example of the warning of Psalm 146: “Do not put your trust in princes” — or, Hayek would add, central banks.

Wrote Hayek, “Where I’m not sure is whether in such a competition for reliability any government-issued currency would prevail, or whether the preference would not be in favor of some such units as ounces of gold. It seems not unlikely that gold would ultimately re-assert its place… if people were given complete freedom to decide what to use as their standard.”

So I turn to my readers. Had they the freedom to choose the money they really wanted, what would it be? Would it be gold, or the Fed’s inflationist paper currency, or a cryptocurrency, or something else? Do they, like Hayek, think gold would win in a free competition?

The Crisis at the Fed That No One Talks About

It’s staring the new chairman of the central bank squarely in the face.

Published in The New York Sun.

Of all the issues facing the Federal Reserve’s new chairman, Kevin Warsh, one that gets little public attention is the financial condition of the Fed itself. In addition to its much-publicized roles of setting short-term interest rates, which may be headed back up, and creating inflation, which is already too high, the Fed is a giant financial enterprise. It has total assets of $6.9 trillion as of March 31 combined with negative real capital.

The Fed has lost hundreds of billions of dollars due to its huge interest rate risk position. This costly risk was established under the then-chairman, Ben Bernanke, who assured Congress it would be temporary. It wasn’t. It was continued under the regimes of Janet Yellen and Jerome Powell and remains embedded in the Fed’s balance sheet today, almost 18 years after Mr. Bernanke’s original gamble.

It’s waiting for Chairman Warsh. The interest rate risk position is fundamentally simple. It consists of making long-term, fixed rate investments financed by floating rate funding: invest long, borrow short. It closely resembles the risk of a typical 1980s savings and loan. Because it took this risk, the Fed reported large net losses for the three calendar years 2023, 2024, and 2025, with the losses totaling the egregious sum of $211 billion.

This is more than four times the Fed’s total book capital of $46 billion, which means that its capital is gone, even though the Fed refuses to show any reduction in the capital on its financial statements. The Fed argues that it can on its own decide on a special accounting treatment for itself, different from everybody else, which it would never allow its regulated banks to follow.

In addition to the annual operating losses, the Fed has suffered as of March 31 mark-to-market losses of $857 billion. The Treasury securities the Fed owns are worth on the market $546 billion less than it paid for them. Its mortgage-backed securities are worth $311 billion less than it paid. The operating losses and mark-to-market losses together add up to more than $1 trillion and are 23 times the Fed’s reported book capital.

The Fed has often claimed that no one should worry about its enormous losses, because it wasn’t set up to be a “profit maximizer.” However, the Fed most certainly was set up to make profits for the government. It forks over almost all its profits, which it always has had historically, to the Treasury. When it makes losses instead, payments don’t go to the Treasury, so the federal deficit and the national debt grow correspondingly bigger. The Fed’s losses are the Treasury’s and taxpayers’ losses.

The owners of the Fed’s stock should also care about its losses. All $39.7 billion of the Fed’s paid-in capital is owned by private banks. Under a little-known provision of the Federal Reserve Act, they are liable to be assessed up to twice their investment in the stock to offset losses. This is disclosed in the Fed’s financial statements, although pretty well buried down in the footnotes.

The Fed could reduce its interest rate risk by selling some of its long-term Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities. If it did, though, the mark-to-market losses would become permanent cash losses. The Fed could no longer claim they were only “paper losses.” On top of that, serious Fed selling would push long-term Treasury and mortgage interest rates higher: Not a political winner.

In the first quarter of 2026, the Fed reported a modest profit of $1.4 billion. Does this mean its profitability and interest rate risk problems are over? It doesn’t. My estimate is that the Fed has — on a net basis — about $2.5 trillion in long-term assets funded short. The bond market is now expecting short-term interest rates to rise again this year. If they do, it would cost the Fed $25 billion or so per year for a 1 percent rise in rates.

Moreover, the profit the Fed reported for the first quarter was only possible because the Fed is being heavily subsidized by the Treasury. To do this, the Treasury holds huge interest-free deposits at the Fed — $893 billion of them on March 31. At current interest rates, these give the Fed an additional profit of $33 billion per year, while increasing the Treasury’s deficit for the year and increasing the national debt by the same $33 billion.

Why doesn’t the Fed pay the Treasury, and thus the taxpayers, the same interest rate on deposits that it pays the private banks? Obviously, it should, and Congress needs to fix this. When we subtract the Treasury’s generous subsidy, the central bank is still running a significant loss, which will grow larger if short-term interest rates rise again.

A New Head for the Fed

Here's what new Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh might be thinking about right now.

Published in Law & Liberty.

Being chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, which includes being its chief executive, is one of the very top jobs not only in the country, but in the world. In the US, the Fed is the central bank, money printer, inflation-creator, and emergency lender to the world’s most important economy and financial markets; it is also all of those to the global dollar-denominated system of payments, borrowing and investing. Its new chairman, Kevin Warsh, is highly intelligent and knowledgeable in finance, economics, and politics. He is also very thoughtful. Here are five of the issues he is or might be thinking about.

1. Shrinking the Fed: Chairman Warsh has been clear about his interest in shrinking the bloated balance sheet of the Fed, and in reducing its heavy interventions or so-called “footprint” in financial markets. In the first quarter of this year, the Fed grew by $35 billion, bringing its total assets to $6.9 trillion as of March 31, 2026. That is 7.5 times as big as the Fed was at the end of 2007, when it produced its last historically normal balance sheet. Ever since then it has been in the Ben Bernanke-induced, abnormally inflated balance sheet mode, which Warsh has often rightly criticized. Although Bernanke, when he was Fed Chairman, promised Congress that this would be temporary, it has not been, but has lasted more than 17 years, so far. Can the Fed shrink back to normal?

At the end of 2007, the Fed’s total assets were $894 billion. That was 6.2 percent of nominal GDP and 8.3 percent of commercial banking assets. To get to these same percentages today, the Fed would have to shrink by more than $4 trillion, including selling a couple trillion of long-term Treasury securities. In 2007, the Fed’s investment in mortgage-backed securities was zero, which is what it should be. How the Fed convinced itself to become and remain the biggest investor with the biggest footprint in mortgages is a puzzle indeed. To get back to zero, it would have to unload its $2 trillion in MBS, the purchase of which so distorted the mortgage market and house prices.

Chairman Warsh has of course considered how any material sales of investments to shrink the Fed would make the prices in the Treasury bond and MBS markets go down and their interest rates go up. Should the Fed push bond and mortgage interest rates up, increase the Treasury’s interest cost, and make houses even less affordable? That seems to have no chance of being a political winner.

On top of that, the Fed has a mark to market loss of $546 billion on its Treasury investments and a loss of $311 billion on its MBS. To sell them would be to move such losses from unrealized, “paper” losses, to realized, cash losses, which would have to be reported on its profit and loss statement. The Fed’s total mark to market loss of $857 billion is about 18 times its total book capital of $48 billion. The Fed insists that nobody cares about its losses, but such numbers would be truly enormous, embarrassing, and obviously poor PR.

Shrinking the Fed looks desirable, but is apparently a longer-term, not a short-term, project. Since the Fed’s most important function is to finance the government of which it is a part, I have suggested that a reasonable longer-term target size for the Fed might be 10 percent of the national debt. Today, that would mean a Fed about $3 trillion smaller than it is.

2. The Unknowable Right Interest Rate: Eight times a year we are treated to the melodrama of the Fed’s Open Market Committee meeting to set, and since the Bernanke time, to forecast with their “dot plots” interest rate paths. Upon reflection, it should be clear to everybody that no committee, including this one, can actually know what the right interest rate is, and certainly it cannot know what future interest rates will be. The committee’s forecasting record makes that apparent. As then-Fed Chairman Jerome Powell so rightly observed, “We are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies.” I think this saying should be forever enshrined in Fed lore right next to William McChesney Martin’s famous “punchbowl” line.

Chairman Warsh seems inclined to get rid of the “dot plot” forecasting and any inclination for the committee members to feel committed by their past recorded guesses. This is a good idea. In addition, will he privately brood about the larger question of whether it really makes sense to have a national price fixing committee for interest rates?

3. Perpetual Inflation at 2 percent?: Among the Fed’s heirlooms from the Bernanke years is the notion that the Fed can on its own, without Congressional approval, commit the United States to perpetual inflation at the rate of 2 percent per year—in other words, to quintupling prices in an average lifetime. The inflation targeting regime has given us the historically anomalous experience of central bankers claiming they have to get inflation up. This regime has presided over not only the runaway inflation of 2021–22, but also current inflation at nearly twice the target rate.

It is now 14 years since the Fed unilaterally announced its target of 2 percent inflation forever. It seems like time for a critical reconsideration of it. International financial expert William White has a forthcoming article: “The Inflation Targeting Framework for Monetary Policy Needs to be Challenged.” This seems right to me. Chairman Warsh’s comments on how to think about inflation suggest he may be open to such a reexamination.

4. The Role of the Money Supply: Did the Fed and other central banks somehow forget about the perennial role of creating too much money in fostering inflation and depreciating the currency? It seems that by rejecting a mechanical relationship of money supply and prices, they embarrassingly made the opposite error, which explains their woefully wrong forecasts of inflation and interest rates in the early 2020s.

The British economist Tim Congdon, whose forecasts in this period were based on money supply and were far superior to those of the Fed and the Bank of England, concludes that “the behavior of money growth must be restored to a central position in policy-oriented macroeconomic analysis.” Chairman Warsh might be thinking about whether the Fed should take this advice.

5. Thinking Clearly About the Fed’s Finances: Among other things, the Fed is a giant financial enterprise. It is designed to make money for the government, but in recent years has lost heavily instead, with combined reported net losses for the three years 2023–25 of $211 billion. To this should be added the $857 billion in mark to market losses discussed above.

The Fed reported a net profit of $1.4 billion in the first quarter of 2026, but this modest profit was only possible because the Fed is being heavily subsidized by the US Treasury. The Treasury does this by holding vast interest-free deposits in the Fed—of $893 billion on March 31 of this year. At current interest rates, these will give the Fed $33 billion in profit, which it will not return in remittances to the Treasury this year, only in the hazy future. This increases the current year’s federal deficit and runs up the national debt by the same $33 billion—not a very good deal for the Treasury or the taxpayers. To fix it, the Fed should simply pay the Treasury interest on its deposits, the same way it pays interest to banks.

For clarity, you can divide the Fed into three main functions: issuing currency, which at current interest rates makes profits of about $87 billion a year; the $33 billion in profit from the Treasury subsidy; and then everything else, which includes the Fed’s trillions in underwater long-term investments. This third function appears to be making losses at the rate of about $113 billion a year.

As chief executive of the Federal Reserve and a financial expert himself, Chairman Warsh might be thinking of how to provide rigorous explanations to Congress of the Fed’s financial performance, balance sheet and financial outlook, making these clear to the legislature, which is his boss.

Seven Questions for Kevin Warsh, Newly Confirmed as Chairman of the Fed

And some startling answers from the Sun’s monetary columnist.

Published in The New York Sun.

The Federal Reserve is at the center of the pure paper money system of the United States and the world. As the Fed transitions to a new chairman, it is timely to consider some questions about this remarkable, powerful, dangerous, and allegedly “independent” institution. Here are seven questions for the new chairman, Kevin Warsh, and his colleagues:

Do we need a national price fixing committee for interest rates?

Answer: No.

Nothing is more obvious in free market economics than that having centralized price fixing by the government is a really bad idea. The constant discovery of clearing prices by competitive markets is what is needed. Yet the Fed’s Open Market Committee is a national price fixing committee by another name for one of the most important prices: interest rates. Amazing mistake, if you think about it.

Does the Fed know what it’s doing?

Answer: No.

As the outgoing chairman of the Fed, Jerome Powell wittily and correctly said about the Fed, “We are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies.” So it is, and so it must be. Neither the Fed nor anybody else ever knew or ever can know what the correct interest rates are. To do that they would have to know the future, and the economic future is always uncertain, not only unknown but unknowable. The Fed’s forecasting record is poor because it cannot know what it is really doing.

How much money has the Fed lost on its “QE” gamble — and whose money was it?

Answer: It has lost more than $1.3 trillion of the taxpayers’ money.

The Fed made a gamble on what it called “Quantitative Easing,” or “QE,” described by its chairman at the time, Ben Bernanke, as a “shot in the dark.” It was a macroeconomic gamble that stoked asset price inflations. It was a financial gamble with the Fed’s own earnings and capital.

The huge resulting total losses are the sum of three factors. The Fed reported net operating losses of about $220 billion since 2022. In addition, the QE losses wiped out more than $300 billion in profits the Fed made by issuing currency and holding interest-free deposits from the Treasury.

So quantitative easing’s operating losses exceed $500 billion. On top of that, QE has resulted in mark-to-market losses of $844 billion. In sum, the more than $1.3 trillion in losses mean that the costs will be borne by the taxpayers and suggest that the Fed has lost the entire $47 billion capital of its commercial bank shareholders about 27 times over.

Does the Federal Reserve Act assign the Fed a goal of “price stability”?

Answer: No.

“Price stability” is a tricky term that means, according to the Fed, perpetual inflation at some rate it chooses. It means that overall prices always rise. That is not what the Federal Reserve Act says. The Act assigns to the Fed an objective of “stable prices,” a clear term. It means prices that are stable. In other words, it means average inflation of approximately zero. The Fed was rhetorically clever to use “price stability” in all its presentations when it decided to pursue perpetual inflation, since it obviously was not pursuing stable prices.

Should the Fed have a monopoly in American money?

Answer: No.

As suggested by Friedrich Hayek in “Competition in Currency,” an essay now canonical among cryptocurrency enthusiasts, to control a central bank’s urge to impose inflation on the people, one could create competition in currency. Then the people could use the money they believe will best hold its value. The same essay shows that what Hayek really wanted was a renewed monetary role for gold to evolve from this competition.

Could there be a renewed monetary role for gold?

Answer: We should try to develop one.

The Fed might start by owning some gold to diversify its assets. Today, unlike most major central banks, it owns exactly zero gold and so has missed out on the great gold rally, which was really the great depreciation of the Federal Reserve dollar — by 99 percent against gold since 1971. Various American states have projects to make gold a legal tender, which might allow 100 percent gold-backed electronic currencies to compete with paper dollars.

Should the Federal Reserve be “independent”?

Answer: No.

No part of the government in any branch should be an independent fiefdom. Fundamental to our constitutional republic is that every part of the government must be a part of our system of checks and balances. In the Fed’s case, this means there needs to be much enhanced accountability to the Congress.

Fannie, Freddie, and the National Debt

Published with Edward J. Pinto in Law & Liberty.

Fannie and Freddie are part of the government and need to be included in its consolidated financial statements.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are huge, with $7.8 trillion in assets and $7.6 trillion in liabilities. They are an essential part of the finances of the US government. But we do not find them as part of the government’s consolidated financial statements. We should.

This is due not only to their sheer size but also because of the giant taxpayer risk they represent, the government’s principal ownership of them, the total government control of their operations, and the obvious fact that these conditions are not temporary but long-term and ongoing. We believe that without consolidating Fannie and Freddie, a true and fair view of the government’s financial condition is not possible.

We understand the natural desire of politicians to keep Fannie and Freddie’s $7.6 trillion in liabilities off the government’s consolidated books. Accurately recording these obligations would increase the reported amount of government debt held by the public by about 25 percent—from $30.8 trillion to $38.4 trillion as of December 31, 2025. With Fannie and Freddie correctly consolidated, the total government debt would be $46.1 trillion.

Obviously, it is politically tempting to keep the obligations Fannie and Freddie impose on the taxpayers pushed obscurely down into the footnotes. Indeed, to get Fannie’s debt off the government’s books was the very reason for making it a so-called “government-sponsored enterprise” in 1968, a status later repeated for Freddie. We suggest that this twentieth-century idea has become obsolete.

Fannie and Freddie’s nature has changed radically in this century. When we apply the current facts about them to the governing accounting principles of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), it appears the 2008 decision not to consolidate them is no longer defensible. To summarize today’s reality, Fannie and Freddie are no longer government-sponsored, privately-owned, and managed enterprises. Instead, they are government-owned and government-controlled agencies. Nothing is clearer than that the taxpayers are on the hook for all their debt and risk, and that government officers are fully in command. They are just parts of the government now and should be accounted for accordingly.

The governing “Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 47, Reporting Entity,” defines the criteria to decide between a “consolidation entity” included in the government’s consolidated financial statements, and a “disclosure entity” which resides in the footnotes, off-balance sheet. These criteria are whether “as a whole, the organization: a) is financed through taxes and other non-exchange revenues; b) is governed by the Congress or the President; c) imposes or may impose risks and rewards to the government; and d) provides goods and services on a non-market basis.” Note 1 to the US Government Financial Statements adds the view that Fannie and Freddie’s “relationship to the government is not expected to be permanent.”

Taking these in order:

Fannie and Freddie’s financing completely depends on the government.

All of Fannie and Freddie’s revenues and financing depend upon the guarantee of their obligations by the government. Without this guarantee, neither of them could exist for a day. This guarantee means their revenue depends on access to the taxing power of the government. Moreover, the guarantee is provided to them for free, the essence of a non-exchange arrangement. This is a permanent arrangement.

There is no non-government governance of Fannie and Freddie and has not been for more than 17 years.

It is often said that this guarantee is “implicit,” but no informed person doubts that it is real. And everybody is right about this. President Trump, for example, has confirmed the government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie and stated that it will be retained. We feel sure that the reality of this guarantee, essential to Fannie and Freddie’s very existence, is a view shared by the US Treasury, by all Fannie and Freddie’s customers and creditors, and by FASAB, too.

Fannie and Freddie’s equity financing also depends on the government. The government’s stake in their equity is a $367 billion liquidation preference in their combined senior preferred stock. Subtracting this government stake from their total equity of $179 billion would leave them both technically insolvent, with a combined non-government equity of negative $188 billion. On top of this, the government has the right to acquire 79.9 percent of the common stock of both for one-thousandth of a cent per share. This totals to less than $55,000.

Fannie and Freddie are completely controlled by the government.

Fannie and Freddie are entirely subject to their conservator, who is the director of the Federal Housing Finance Board. Under the law, the conservator wields the complete power of their boards of directors and executives as well as being their regulator, and moreover, he has made himself the chairman of both of their subordinate boards. The director of the FHFB is removable by and responsible to the president of the United States. An excellent recent example of Fannie and Freddie’s governance is their instructions from the government to buy $200 billion in mortgage-backed securities. As reported by National Mortgage Professional, “In early January, President Donald Trump said he is ordering his ‘representatives’ [Fannie and Freddie] to buy $200 billion in mortgage bonds to bring down housing costs … FHFA Director Bill Pulte said on X that Fannie and Freddie will execute the purchase.”

There is no non-government governance of Fannie and Freddie, and has not been for more than 17 years.

Fannie and Freddie impose large risks on and offer rewards to the government.

Because it guarantees their $7.6 trillion in obligations, the government remains fully at risk for big losses at Fannie and Freddie, which may occur, just as it did when Fannie and Freddie went broke from bad loans in 2008. The Treasury provided them a $190 billion bailout, buying senior preferred equity that it still owns. Conversely, when Fannie and Freddie have been profitable under current arrangements, the government has benefited by dividends it has received, or by increases in the liquidation preference of its senior preferred shares, in effect, a dividend in kind. Any increase in the value of the Treasury’s option to acquire most of Fannie and Freddie’s common stock for less than $55,000 would also be a reward.

Fannie and Freddie provide financial services on a non-market basis.

Fannie and Freddie operate at extremely high, non-market leverage. Most of their earnings are made possible by their non-market, free guarantee from the government, for which, by the way, neither has ever paid even one cent. We have calculated that if they had to pay a fair rate for their $7.6 trillion of free government guarantee, it would absorb 50 percent to 100 percent of their pre-tax profit. The entire political rationale for Fannie and Freddie’s existence is that they create mortgage financing at interest rates below what the market would offer, possible only because of their deep links to the government, of which they have now become simply a part.

The characteristics that make Fannie and Freddie “consolidation entities” are not temporary, but are long-term or permanent. Having the government guaranty, being financially dependent on the government, imposing large risks on the government, and operating on a non-market basis are all permanent parts of Fannie and Freddie. Being mostly owned by and completely controlled by the government is not temporary, since it has been going on for 17 years, and the situation has outlasted many attempts at legislative reforms or attempted so-called “privatizations.” There appears to be a strong probability that the current situation will simply continue. President Trump has said as much: “I will stay strong in my position on overseeing them as President.”

Considering all these elements as a whole, we conclude that Fannie and Freddie should be consolidated in the US government’s financial statements. As a result, the proper consolidated total of government debt is $7.6 trillion greater than officially reported.

Letter: Here are three things the Fed is actually good at

Published in the Financial Times.

Your Big Read feature “Is Warsh set to be the next Fed fall guy?” (April 20) repeats a myth which should be long dead: that the Federal Reserve’s job includes “the management of the biggest economy on the planet”.

On the contrary. To “manage the economy” would require knowledge of the future that neither the Fed nor anyone else has, or can have.

At its creation in 1913, it was thought that the Fed would prevent future financial crises and panics. Obviously it didn’t.

In the heyday of Keynesian hopes in the 1960s, it was thought that the Fed could be part of ending financial cycles. Obviously it couldn’t.

As Fed chairman Jerome Powell brilliantly observed in August 2023, the Fed is “navigating by the stars under cloudy skies”. So it is and always must be.

The Fed actually is good at three things. One, printing money to finance financial crises. Two, creating constant inflation and depreciation of the currency it creates, and three, supporting the power of the government by monetising the government’s debt.

But “managing the economy” is far and forever beyond its capability.

How Much Should the Federal Reserve Shrink?

Whether our central bank should or could shrink, and if so, how much, has become a topic of public debate. 

Published in The New York Sun.

Robert Higgs, in his book “Crisis and Leviathan,” shows how the size, power, and intrusiveness of the government feed on crises. With each crisis, the government becomes bigger. After the crisis is over, it may shrink some, but it rarely goes back to its former size. 

The bloated balance sheet of the Federal Reserve is a perfect demonstration of this phenomenon. At the end of 2007, before the panic of 2008, the Fed produced its last historically normal annual balance sheet. It had total assets of $894 billion. It owned zero mortgage securities.

During the ensuing years, the Fed vastly expanded its balance sheet to a size that was previously unimaginable. By Peak Fed in March 2022, it had total assets of $8.9 trillion, or 10 times its 2007 level. It had investments in mortgage securities of $2.7 trillion, three times its total 2007 assets.

Since then, just as Mr. Higgs would predict, the Fed’s size has been reduced, but to nowhere near its previous level. As of the end of March 2026, the Fed’s total assets are still $6.7 trillion or 7.5 times their 2007 level and it still owns $2 trillion in mortgage securities, compared to the zero it should have. The Fed has stopped reducing its size — it is now $34 billion bigger than it was at the end of 2025.

Whatever happened to the assurance Chairman Bernanke’s gave in 2011 to Congress that “there will be no permanent increase… in the Fed’s balance sheet”? We can consider it either a memorable broken promise or a fully flubbed forecast. 

The Fed has two basic parts: the mundane job of simply buying Treasury securities with the United States currency it has the monopoly on issuing; and everything else. In 2007, the mundane “Currency Fed” had $792 billion in currency outstanding, so everything else in the Fed’s balance sheet totaled only $102 billion. 

At Peak Fed, the “Everything Else” part of the Fed, which had come to include in effect a giant savings and loan for holding mortgage assets and an even bigger hedge fund for investing in long-term Treasury securities financed overnight, totaled $6.7 trillion. In other words, the activist, interventionist, financial risk-taking part of the Fed had increased since 2007 by 66 times. As of today, that increase is still 42 times. 

The financial results of the Fed’s risk taking are an aggregate operating loss of $224 billion plus a mark-to-market loss of $845 billion, or well over $1 trillion in total. These are costs not just to the Fed itself but to the Treasury and the taxpayers. In addition, the Fed’s mortgage buying spree, by driving mortgage interest rates to abnormally low levels, pushed house prices up to abnormally high levels.

The “affordability crisis” in American housing thus significantly reflects the results of the Fed’s bloated balance sheet. Even though the Fed should get out of its mortgage investments, it certainly does not want to sell them now because doing so would create a more than $300 billion realized loss. On top of that, selling would drive mortgage interest rates up — a politically unacceptable result.

Whether the Fed should or could shrink, and if so, how much, has become a topic of public debate. How much shrinkage would it take to get the current Fed back to the 2007 base case, appropriately adjusted?

In 2007, the Fed’s assets were equal to 6.2 percent of nominal GDP and 8.3 percent of total commercial banking assets. To reach these same percentages, the Fed would have to shrink to $2 trillion in assets. This is not possible because the Fed’s assets must by definition be something greater than its currency outstanding, currently $2.4 trillion.

An essential mandate of the Fed, like all central banks, is to finance the government of which it is a part. Expanding its balance sheet is a way to force the commercial banking system to lend to the government. In 2007, the Fed’s assets were 9.7 percent of the national debt. To return to this level the Fed’s assets would need to fall to about $3.8 trillion, or be reduced by $2.9 trillion. 

A reasonable target for the normalized size of the Fed might be a rounded to 10 percent of the national debt. The Fed’s assets would then be $3.9 trillion instead of $6.7 trillion. Since we know the Fed cannot sell its mortgage securities, however, to its allowed assets might be added its $2 trillion in mortgage securities, provided that these mortgage investments be put and kept in run-off until they reach zero again.

That would suggest a current shrinkage of the Fed to $5.9 trillion, or shrinkage of $800 billion plus however much the mortgage assets run off. Of course, in the next crisis, all bets are off and the Fed’s balance sheet may bloat once more.

Bernanke’s Broken Promise: Is It Time To Shrink the Fed Yet?

Published in The New York Sun.

“It’s a temporary action,” the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, testified before Congress on February 9, 2011, 15 years ago. He was referring to the radical expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet begun under his leadership in 2008 by so-called “Quantitative Easing,” which monetized long-term Treasury debt and 30-year mortgage securities. By 2011, QE had inflated the Fed’s total assets to $2.5 trillion. That was 2. 7 times their $915 billion at the end of 2007, the Fed’s last historically-normal annual balance sheet.

Mr. Bernanke further testified, in what certainly sounded like a promise, “what we are doing here is a temporary measure which will be reversed.” Note that was not “may” be or “can” be, but “will” be. Fifteen years later, it hasn’t happened.  

“At the end of this process,” Mr. Bernanke continued, “the amount of the Fed’s balance sheet will be normalized, and there will be no permanent increase, either in money outstanding [or] in the Fed’s balance sheet.”  That promise, or at least prediction, stands in striking contrast with reality.

Today the Fed’s total assets are $6.6 trillion.  That is 2.6 times as big as when Mr. Bernanke was testifying, and 7.2 times as big as in 2007. 

Among the Fed’s assets all these years later we find $1.6 trillion in Treasury bonds which still have more than ten years left to maturity.  More egregiously, we find $2 trillion in long-term mortgage securities.  

The Fed’s monetization of mortgages, which has massively distorted the housing market, should in my opinion be zero, as it always was from the creation of the Fed in 1913 until 2008. Today the mortgage portfolio alone is more than twice as big as the whole Fed was in 2007.

All this doesn’t sound too “temporary.” Even if one would be tempted to paraphrase President Clinton — “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘temporary’ is”— one would have to admit that 15 years after Mr. Bernanke’s testimony and going on 18 years after the beginning of the QE program, it does not qualify as temporary.

The question of what is “temporary” was raised by Congressman Scott Garrett in the 2011 hearing.  “What you have is a difference between one’s interpretation of what is permanent and what is temporary,” Mr. Garrett said, insightfully adding, “I imagine no Fed Chairman would ever come to this witness table and say, ‘I am engaging in permanent monetization of the debt,’ [but] describe it as, ‘I’m only taking a temporary action’…. Isn’t that correct?”

Mr. Bernanke replied, “That’s what we are doing.  It’s a temporary action.”  That was doubtless what he intended at the time, but it isn’t what happened. What this “temporary action” was going to do to the Fed’s own risk and financial performance was raised by the chairman of the hearing, Congressman Paul Ryan. “Have you done a stress test on your balance sheet?” he responsibly asked.  “And what level of losses do you think is acceptable as you withdraw?”

The Fed’s most recent published mark to market of its investments, as of September 2025, provides the future answer to Mr. Ryan’s question: There would be a loss of $856 billion required to liquidate the Fed’s long-term investments. To this sum must be added the Fed’s accumulated operating losses of $224 billion since 2022, all caused by the financial risk of QE. If one uses only the losses of the QE program itself, removing the profits made by other parts of the Fed, the QE-alone operating losses since 2022 exceed $500 billion. These are equally losses to the U.S. Treasury.

Would Mr. Ryan have thought that “acceptable”?  Would Mr. Bernanke have?

Here is what Mr. Bernanke answered: “We have done multiple stress tests. Under most likely scenarios, the fiscal implications of the balance sheet are positive… Under most plausible scenarios, this policy will continue to be profitable.” Reality turned out not to be one of the “plausible scenarios.”

It’s too bad that Mr. Ryan did not follow up by asking for a copy of the Fed’s risk analysis for Congressional oversight of the unprecedented risk of QE. For now it appears that the Fed has lost another $2 billion in the first two months of 2026 despite the enormous subsidy it is receiving from the Treasury in the form of over $800 billion in interest-free deposits. These deposits generate income of about $30 billion a year for the Fed at current interest rates. They increase the Treasury’s deficit by the same amount.

Is it finally time to shrink the Fed to its normal size?  Unfortunately, because of the giant market value losses embedded in the Fed’s QE investments, selling them would be far too expensive. So Mr. Bernanke’s “temporary action” will continue into its 19th year.

The Fed Was Built on Non-Ph.Ds Like Warsh

See, for example, the central bank buildings named for Marriner Eccles and William McChesney Martin.

Published in The Wall Street Journal.

“The dumbest criticism,” as your editorial rightly says, of the good pick of Kevin Warsh for Federal Reserve chairman is that he “doesn’t have an economics Ph.D” (“Warsh Is the Right Fed Choice,” Jan. 31). That criticism also displays a total ignorance of Fed history. For example, the Washington headquarters of the Fed are named after Marriner Eccles, who was Fed chairman for 14 years, 1934-1948. Not only did Eccles not have a Ph.D. in economics, he never went to a university, but learned on the job as a successful banker and investor.

The nearby Fed building is named after William McChesney Martin, probably the greatest Fed chairman in my view, who served under five U.S. presidents from 1951 to 1970. Martin had a B.A., having studied English and Latin. The justly celebrated Paul Volcker, central banking hero and Fed chairman from 1979 to 1987, had an M.A. in political economy, but no Ph.D. And as you imply, the new chairman of the Fed will have hundreds of Ph.D.s at his beck and call for whatever studies he may desire.

Alex J. Pollock

Senior fellow, Mises Institute

Could — and Should — the Fed Own Gold?

Published in The New York Sun.

A world-historical financial event was the 1971 default by the United States on its international commitment to redeem dollars for gold, thereby creating a purely paper, Nixonian global monetary system. Since then, the value of the United States dollar in gold has dropped by more than 99 percent. The amount of dollars that an ounce of gold will buy has gone up by about 140 times.

During 2025, the dollar’s value in gold fell about 40 percent. Specifically, it fell from 0.38 ounces to 0.23 ounces of gold needed to buy $1,000. In 2026 so far, that has declined further to 0.20 ounces. In other words, one ounce of gold now buys about $5,000, compared to $35 until 1971. This trend has been highly profitable for the many central banks that hold gold as a classic monetary asset.

The Swiss National Bank, Switzerland’s central bank, reported a 2025 profit on its gold holdings of over 36 billion Swiss francs, or more than $46 billion. The SNB is required by law to mark all its investments, including gold, to market and report the results in its profit and loss statement and balance sheet.

Other central banks benefiting from gold as an investment and a reserve against their liabilities include, among others, the European Central Bank, the German Bundesbank, the Bank of France, the Dutch National Bank, the Bank of Italy, the Reserve Bank of India, the Bank of Japan, the People’s Bank of China, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

In comparison, how much profit has the Federal Reserve made on its gold? The answer is not one penny. The Federal Reserve owns no gold at all — not a single ounce. In the terse summary from the Federal Reserve’s official website: “The Federal Reserve does not own gold.”

This situation would have left the authors of the Federal Reserve Act surprised and dismayed. The law required that new Federal Reserve Banks hold gold backing equal to 40 percent of their outstanding dollar bills plus 30 percent of their deposit liabilities. One can imagine the founders of the Fed frowning down in disapproval from legislative Valhalla at the current lack of any gold held by their creation.

The original gold requirement was ended by the Depression-era Gold Reserve Act of 1934, when Congress took all their gold from the Federal Reserve Banks. From the Fed’s point of view, this was the opposite of “reserving” their gold. In exchange, the Fed got claims on the Treasury for paper dollars. With clever rhetoric, these were and are called “gold certificates.”

However, what they really certify is that the gold has been taken. The day after the taking, the dollar was devalued by 41 percent, increasing the dollars one ounce of gold would buy to $35 from $20.67. Since the Fed no longer owned any gold as of the day before, it realized no profit. The Fed has owned no gold since 1934.

The term “gold certificates” has led to widespread confusion. As probably intended by the political rhetoricians of the 1930s, the term has caused many people, even financial experts, to believe the Federal Reserve still owns gold because it has gold certificates. But the Fed’s own website is clear: “Gold certificates do not give the Federal Reserve any right to redeem the certificate for gold.” So much for the certificates and the 1930s.

Coming to today, could the Fed buy and hold gold if it wanted to?  Had it done so, after all, it would have greatly profited as other central banks have. The Fed itself is curiously quiet on this head. It appears that it does not wish to answer it, because the answer would be positive. 

Some commentators cite the 1934 act as preventing current gold purchases, but the relevant provisions of that act were repealed in 1974, more than 50 years ago. Public Law 93-373 of 1974 provides that beginning in 1975: “No provision of any law…may be construed to prohibit any person from purchasing, holding, selling or otherwise dealing in gold.” The term “any person” obviously includes the Federal Reserve Banks.

Moreover, the Federal Reserve Act in its current form provides that each Federal Reserve Bank has the power “to deal in gold coin and bullion at home or abroad.” Congress, which is the superior of the Federal Reserve, should require the Fed to answer clearly two questions: Could the Fed legally buy gold today? And if so, should it join other major central banks in holding gold among its assets?

The Fed, Gold, and Crypto: Freedom and Competing Currencies

Published by The Mises Institute.

This article is adapted from a lecture presented at the 2025 Supporters Summit in Delray Beach, Florida.

Economic freedom should include freedom in money. It’s a freedom even, as we say these days, that advanced economies don’t have. My guiding text for this talk is Friedrich Hayek’s celebrated essay “Choice in Currency.” That is chapter 7 of this excellent book—Hayek for the 21st Century: Essays in Political Economy—that the Mises Institute has published. It’s a classic text, and I hope you’ll all take a look at it if you haven’t.

Now, freedom and money, Hayek suggests, can in concept be created through competition, through freedom of choice in money. That is to say, let the people use any money they want. Let the monies compete with each other, and the superior monies, just like in any competition, will win out. The opposite of this is, of course, a government monopoly in money, which allows the government to inflate.

The point I wish to make is that the ability to control the money is a deep and fundamental source of the power of the state. Each central bank (in our case, the Federal Reserve), of course, is part of the state and a key helper in the project of expanding and maintaining the power of the government over the people. Now, we can think about this. I know you know this already. It’s very simple, but let’s just say it again to remind ourselves. To stay in power, governments have to keep spending money. They need to give money to their friends, to give money to their supporters, to carry out their various projects, and—most expensive of all—to have wars.

In the meantime, people don’t like being taxed, so the politician is put in the position of wanting to spend without taxing. And what’s the answer? Well, you borrow. If the lenders don’t want to lend to you, you simply have a compliant central bank to print up the money that you need, and to buy your bonds, as we have observed over long periods of time now.

That way, you can keep spending. That way, you can maintain your position of power for the government.

Of course, at the same time, you’re depreciating the currency. You have inflated prices, you’ve taken away the people’s purchasing power, which is a kind of implicit taxation, and destroyed part of the value of their wages and their savings. In short, as Hayek writes, “Practically all governments of history have used the exclusive power to issue money in order to defraud and plunder the people.”

Further, Hayek says, “The politician, acting on a modified Keynesian maxim that in the long run we are all out of office”—I think that’s a wonderful line—wants “more and cheaper money,” which is “an ever-present political force which monetary authorities have never been able to resist.”

Well, is it true that the central bank can’t resist? I think it is. On one side of this argument, we had Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Sargent, who proposed in 1982 that we just need central banks that are legally committed to refuse the government’s demand for additional credit. In other words, just to say no to financing deficits with newly created money.

So I wish you to picture this. The Treasury has come to the central bank and said, “Here are these bonds. We want you to buy them.” Imagine the head of the central bank saying, “Well, I’ve got your request, but sorry, we’re not buying a penny of your debt with money we create. Of course, we could do it, but we won’t. So just cut your government expenses and good luck.”

I doubt that this would be a winning career move for a politically appointed chairman of the central bank, and I suspect you doubt it too. And I suspect that its probability is something close to zero, don’t you think? Moreover, in a time of war or other national emergency, the likelihood of this response is precisely zero.

So Hayek, in a very creative intellectual move, says that instead of trying to improve the behavior of the central bankers—which we’re all working on, and we ought to keep working on it—here’s something more radical. Let us simply, quoting Hayek here, “deprive governments (or their monetary authorities) of all power to protect their money against competition.”

Let them go ahead and keep printing up their paper money, just as always. Let them buy as many bonds of the government—finance as many deficits—as they want, but don’t let them have a monopoly in this money. So the money they create for deficit financing, to improve the power of the state, has to compete with some other money that will come along.

Hayek continues, “If people were free to refuse any money they distrusted”—in other words, you can’t have a legal tender law—“and to prefer money in which they had confidence,” there could be no “stronger inducement to governments to ensure the stability of their money.” So make the government compete with other monies, and as in other cases of competition, you’ll improve the quality of the product. And this idea of Hayek’s is indeed consistent with a free society.

Hayek concludes, “I hope it will not be too long before complete freedom to deal in any money one likes will be regarded as the essential mark of a free country.”

Well, that was 50 years ago and we’re not there yet. But today this thought is especially congenial to those who want private cryptocurrencies to compete with dollars, and this Hayek essay is enormously popular among advocates of cryptocurrencies, and taken as a kind of canonical text for competition in currency. It is a philosophical position consistent with their creation.

I do want to note in passing—because stablecoins have been much in the news of late, and we have the GENIUS Act, very favorable to stablecoins—that this thought does not apply to stablecoins because stablecoins are just part of the dollar system. If the dollar is depreciating, your stablecoin is depreciating, too. It doesn’t achieve the Hayekian purpose of competition in money because it’s just part of the dollar monopoly. So, it doesn’t present a competitive currency.

But Hayek, thinking about the possible competitors to the government’s fiat currency, was not really focused on other things that are themselves fiat currencies, whether they be fiat currencies issued by other governments. You could have the euro competing with the dollar, for example, or private fiat currencies such as bitcoin, which isn’t yet a currency but wishes to be.

Hayek was really thinking of gold. This is something about this celebrated essay I think is not usually properly understood. Hayek’s original speech was given in 1975. That was the year after the United States at long last lifted its oppressive 1933 law making it illegal for Americans to own any gold; that is to say, illegal to protect themselves from the depreciation of the monopoly currency of the government.

This ban on gold was an amazing act by the United States, actually, when you look back on it now. It does show how far a government will go to protect the monopoly of its own fiat currency.

So, thinking about gold in contrast to this, Hayek says, “Where I’m not sure is whether in such a competition for reliability any government-issued currency would prevail, or whether the predominant preference would not be in favor of . . . ounces of gold. It seems not unlikely that gold would ultimately re-assert its place as ‘the universal prize in all countries, in all cultures, in all ages,’ . . . if people were given complete freedom to decide what to use as their standard and general medium of exchange.”

What do you think? If we had free competition in monies, do you think that gold would win out as the preferred competitor and thereby force the governments to issue sounder currencies? An interesting thought.

As Hayek also wrote, famously and correctly, competition is a “discovery procedure.” We find out through competition things we couldn’t know otherwise, and if we had such a competition in currencies, that would give us the answer.

Now, think how much things have changed since Harry Dexter White, the chief American negotiator at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and also, as you may recall, a spy for the Soviet Union, asserted that gold and the US dollar were “synonymous.”

We’ve come a long way from Harry Dexter White’s thought there.

As we know, the price of gold and dollars is over $4,000 at the present time. Just think about that relative to the par value exchange rate of dollars and gold out of Bretton Woods, which was $35 an ounce. That’s a factor roughly of 100 to 1. We didn’t quite achieve Harry Dexter White’s synonymousness of dollars and gold.

Now, it’s equally correct to think about the price of dollars in gold as it is to think about the price of gold in dollars. So, in that sense, the price of dollars is down 99% since 1971. One winner of this is the US Treasury, since the US Treasury is long gold, holding 8,000 tons, which is over 261.5 million ounces. So, the unrealized profit to the US Treasury on its gold position is basically $1 trillion.

It’s not on the books, but it’s the reality of the Treasury’s gold position. Now, this contrasts with a notable opinion piece in the Financial Times from about 20 years ago (April 16, 2004), which had the headline “Going, Going, Gold: The Pointlessness of Holding Bullion Continues to Sink In.”

“The barbarous relic, as Keynes called it, is crumbling to dust,” wrote the Financial Times. “For central banks and governments to hold [gold] is a betrayal of the public.” “Gold is on its way out,” they concluded.

Well, things change in economies, as we know. At the time that article was published, the price of gold in dollars was $400, so it’s more than 10 times that now. And at that point, central banks were, as a group, selling gold. Now central banks are buying heavily, and they’re building their positions with gold as a reserve currency. Sort of interesting. Central banks were selling at the bottom, and they’re buying at what might be the top. But that’s perhaps natural human behavior.

My brother Bruce, who lives in Switzerland, remembers that 20 years ago, when the Swiss central bank was forced to sell gold by its politicians, his friends who worked for the bank literally were crying when they were forced to sell their gold.

But today, many central banks are buying gold and increasing gold in their reserves. Can this central bank market for gold perhaps be considered an example of the free competition in currencies which Hayek envisioned?

After all, whatever the case was right after World War II, now no country can force other countries to accept the monopoly of its currency. And among central banks, there actually is choice in which currencies, including gold, to hold in their reserves. So this movement in gold is extremely interesting in and of itself. But something particularly interesting about it is that it seems to be a case of a Hayekian competition in currencies.

Now, an insightful essay by Anthony Deden suggests that when we’re looking at the gold price today, we’re not really looking at gold going up. We’re looking at the dollar going down, or fiat currencies in general declining. This strikes me as quite correct. Deden continues, “If you hold fiat money, you have a claim on the future discretion of politicians. Whereas if you hold gold, you have a claim on the future indiscretion of politicians.”

I think that’s very nice. Or you might say gold is a hedge against the state’s pursuit of power by monetary means.

We can guarantee that as long as it’s able to, through monopoly fiat currency, the state will continue to maintain and expand its power through monetary means. So the state will prevent the competition that Hayek envisioned from occurring, but it can’t prevent it in this interesting international case of central banks.

I think if we contrast the freedom-of-money case that Hayek makes—which will be hard to do in any domestic context because the state will not sit happily by and allow for competition that will reduce its power (we know that)—with the international central bank case, that sharp contrast, I think, is a major reason to study this justifiably celebrated chapter in this book. Thank you.

What Does the Fed Mean To You?

Hosted by the Mises Institute.

Mises Senior Fellow Alex J. Pollock explains how the post-1971 “Nixonian” paper-money world makes the Fed both the engine of inflation and a prop for an oversized state, urging students to see central banking as the hidden arsonist behind booms, busts, and the erosion of their future purchasing power.

Recorded at Cornerstone University in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on November 1, 2025.

Does the Fed have an ethics problem?

Published in American Banker.

Expert Quote: "When you're in a position that's as influential as working at the Federal Reserve, you're governed by the law of Caesar's wife — be above suspicion." — Alex Pollock, senior fellow at the Mises Institute.

What Have the Inflation-Mongers Wrought?

Our still-young 21st century has already had two bubbles in United States house prices.

Published in The New York Sun.

Is the Federal Reserve an “inflation-monger,” as monetary economist Brendan Brown labels it in his new book, “Bad Money”? Of course it is. The Fed has stuck us with a constant depreciation of the purchasing power of the dollar. With its “inflation targeting” regime beginning in 2012, it promises to continue to depreciate the dollar forever, inflation without end.

Fed representatives have now been known to opine that inflation is too low and they should get it up. That is a radical departure from their forebears. William McChesney Martin, chairman of the Fed between 1951 and 1970, considered inflation “a thief in the night.” Alan Greenspan, the chairman between 1987 and 2006, said that he thought the ideal inflation rate was “zero, properly measured.”

The Fed’s actions have not lived up to its words in this respect, but from Chairman Ben Bernanke on, the Fed has forsaken even the words and changed its tune to inflation-promising. At the same time, the Fed constantly plays the refrain that it must be “independent.”

It is, of course, nonsense to think that any part of a constitutional republic can be a separate and autonomous power, a law unto itself, or a band of platonic philosopher-kings.

If one believed, however, that the Fed truly stood for sound money and would control the inflationist urges of presidents and other politicians, you might feel a twinge of temptation toward the independence line. Yet since the Fed itself is inflationist, its “independence” has no appeal at all, on top of being constitutionally wrong.

The logic of Mr. Brown’s argument should be widely understood. Here it is, in summary:

Good Money displays stable purchasing power and reliable value on average over time. Bad Money always depreciates in value and has shrinking purchasing power, as the government and its central bank impose inflation on the people.

Individual prices must go up and down to fulfil their essential role in resource allocation. But inevitably the overall tendency of prices will sometimes rise, especially when there are wars or other crises which get financed by monetary expansion.

Because prices will sometimes rise, in order for prices to be stable on average over time, at some other times prices must fall. Stated alternately: If prices don’t fall sometimes, you can’t have stable prices.

Yet should overall prices ever be allowed to fall? That is what the inflation-mongers want precisely to prevent. They wish to reinflate any periodic tendency for prices to fall. Under this doctrine, every time prices go up, they create a permanently higher level, and then continue inflating from there.

The inflation-mongers always emphasize changes in the rate at which prices are rising, not the ever-higher level of prices that is so obvious to ordinary consumers. When the rate of increase in prices is 3 percent instead of 4 percent, they can announce that “inflation is down.”

Yet “inflation is down” entails “prices are up.” At 3 percent inflation over an 80-year lifetime, prices will multiply by a factor of more than 10. A dollar will become nine cents, but we would be told that “inflation is stable.”

Inflation-mongers suffer from the fear of any fall in average prices, or “deflation phobia.” This probably arises from memories of the 1930s, but a knowledge of longer economic history gives a wider view.

While a debt deflation in the wake of a collapsed bubble is indeed bad deflation, periods of major innovation and increasing productivity in a competitive economy naturally cause prices to fall, thereby improving the standard of living. This is good deflation.

There are three kinds of inflation: Monetary inflation by the central bank; inflation of goods and services prices; and inflation of asset prices. If the economy is benefitting from good deflation resulting from innovation and productivity, but the inflation-mongers offset this by monetary inflation, the resulting inflation rate in goods and services may still look acceptable, but is greater than it looks.

If it has been moved, say, to +2 percent in goods and services from a natural -1 percent, the move has actually been 3 percent. The monetary inflation would likely also flow into asset price inflation and recurring asset price bubbles.

Our still-young 21st century has already had two bubbles in United States house prices. Both reflected among their key causes artificially low interest rates from Federal Reserve monetary inflation, which stoked artificially high house prices.

The first housing bubble ended in a terrific collapse, the second has caused a crisis of unaffordability and now appears to be topping out far over the peak of the first. This the inflation-mongers have wrought.

Even 2% Inflation Is Too Much

Published in The Wall Street Journal.

As you suggest in “Getting Used to 3% Inflation” (Review & Outlook, Oct. 25), 3% is a lot of inflation, much worse than 2%, which is already too high. At a sustained 2%, which the Federal Reserve promises, average prices will nearly quintuple in 80 years, and the dollar will shrink to a value of 20 cents. At 3%, it’s worse: Average prices will multiply more than 10 times, and the dollar will reduce to 9 cents. Neither satisfies the goal of “stable prices” assigned by the Federal Reserve Act. As the great Paul Volcker wrote in his autobiography, “The real danger comes from encouraging or inadvertently tolerating rising inflation and its close cousin of extreme speculation.”

Alex J. Pollock

Mises Institute

Lake Forest, Ill.

Hayek’s Last Hurrah, So To Speak: A Choice in Currency Emerges Among Central Banks

Many are scrambling to purchase the precious metal as the gold value of the greenback plunges to new lows.

Published in The New York Sun.

Since 1971, in the Nixonian monetary era, the American government has enjoyed a power derived from the pure fiat paper money that its central bank can print in unlimited quantities to finance the government’s deficits. Simply put, politicians naturally like to keep passing out money to stay in office. It’s convenient, politicians reckon, to have a compliant central bank to buy government bonds with printed money — especially if the Congress is spending more than taxes bring in.

Of course, this scheme depreciates the currency, taking away the people’s purchasing power and the value of their savings and wages. As Friedrich Hayek observed in his essay “Choice in Currency,” “Practically all governments of history have used their exclusive power to issue money in order to defraud and plunder the people.”

Hayek argued that the essential problem is that the government’s central bank has an “exclusive power” to print money, or in other words, a monopoly on money, so it can impose its depreciating currency on the people. He suggested that since there is no hope of reforming the central bank, instead we should focus on taking away its monopoly. Thus:

“Let us deprive governments [and] their monetary authorities of all power to protect their money against competition.” Then “if people were free to refuse any money they distrusted and to prefer money in which they had confidence, [there] could be no stronger inducement to governments to ensure the stability of their money.”

In other words, let choice in currency and competition among currencies discipline the government and its central bank. If they produce an inferior money, that money would lose out to the better one supplied by someone else. This was an innovative application of classic market logic to the problem of money, one notably consistent with a free society.

Hayek concluded, “I hope it will not be too long before complete freedom to deal in any money one likes will be regarded as the essential mark of a free country.” A recent introduction to Hayek’s thought observes that this essay “is enormously popular among advocates of cryptocurrencies.”

Hayek, in any event, was not most concerned with competition for the government’s fiat currency by other fiat currencies, whether those of other governments or private currencies. He was really thinking of gold. “It seems not unlikely,” he suggested, “that gold would ultimately reassert its place as the universal prize if people were given complete freedom to decide.”

Hayek’s essay originated shortly after the American government at long last lifted its oppressive 1933 prohibition of Americans owning any gold, which it had made into a criminal offense. All Americans were prohibited by their government from protecting themselves with gold from the ongoing depreciation of their currency by the Federal Reserve.

That may seem amazing to us now, but it clearly shows how far even a democratic government will go to protect the monopoly of its own fiat currency. The chief American negotiator at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, Harry Dexter White, claimed that for international use, “the United States dollar and gold are synonymous,” as Benn Steil reports in “The Battle of Bretton Woods.” We are a long way from there.

With the value of a thousand American dollars currently at about one-quarter of an ounce of gold, as compared to the old Bretton Woods price of 28.6 ounces, the value of the dollar has depreciated by 99 percent against gold. White’s view did not hold up, and neither did the confident assertions of this Financial Times editorial from 2004:

“The barbarous relic is crumbling to dust,” the FT’s editors wrote. “For central banks and governments to hold it as a reserve asset is a betrayal of the public. Given the pointlessness of holding gold, gold is on its way out as an investment and as a reserve asset.”

Today, in contrast, many central banks are buying gold and increasing the allocation to gold in their reserves, and the unrealized profit of the U.S. Treasury on its gold has reached about $1 trillion. The Fed, meanwhile, owns no gold, and adding together its operating and mark to market losses has a total loss of around $1 trillion.

The international market for central bank reserves cannot be monopolized like a domestic currency can. Perhaps in this central bank market we are now seeing Hayek’s scenario of choice and competition in currencies actually playing out. Gold seems to be winning this round.

How Congress Should Reform the Fed

The Human Action Podcast

Alex Pollock joins the Human Action Podcast to explain his recent Congressional testimony on the Fed’s growing insolvency and mandate overreach. The Fed now admits to $243 billion in operating losses and nearly $1 trillion in mark-to-market losses, leaving it with negative capital of about $197 billion. Pollock explains how the central bank transformed itself into “the biggest 1980s-style savings and loan in history” — funding short while buying long, and bleeding cash as interest rates rose.

• Read the Congressional Testimony: Mises.org/HAP523a

• Read More from Alex Pollock: Mises.org/HAP523b

As Fed mulls the end of QT, what lessons have been learned?

Published in American Banker.

Expert Quote: "You can argue about whether it's good or not. I think it's okay to do emergency things in times of crisis, but you have to stop doing them when the crisis is over." — Alex Pollock, senior fellow, Mises Institute.