Fannie, Freddie, and the National Debt

Published with Edward J. Pinto in Law & Liberty.

Fannie and Freddie are part of the government and need to be included in its consolidated financial statements.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are huge, with $7.8 trillion in assets and $7.6 trillion in liabilities. They are an essential part of the finances of the US government. But we do not find them as part of the government’s consolidated financial statements. We should.

This is due not only to their sheer size but also because of the giant taxpayer risk they represent, the government’s principal ownership of them, the total government control of their operations, and the obvious fact that these conditions are not temporary but long-term and ongoing. We believe that without consolidating Fannie and Freddie, a true and fair view of the government’s financial condition is not possible.

We understand the natural desire of politicians to keep Fannie and Freddie’s $7.6 trillion in liabilities off the government’s consolidated books. Accurately recording these obligations would increase the reported amount of government debt held by the public by about 25 percent—from $30.8 trillion to $38.4 trillion as of December 31, 2025. With Fannie and Freddie correctly consolidated, the total government debt would be $46.1 trillion.

Obviously, it is politically tempting to keep the obligations Fannie and Freddie impose on the taxpayers pushed obscurely down into the footnotes. Indeed, to get Fannie’s debt off the government’s books was the very reason for making it a so-called “government-sponsored enterprise” in 1968, a status later repeated for Freddie. We suggest that this twentieth-century idea has become obsolete.

Fannie and Freddie’s nature has changed radically in this century. When we apply the current facts about them to the governing accounting principles of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), it appears the 2008 decision not to consolidate them is no longer defensible. To summarize today’s reality, Fannie and Freddie are no longer government-sponsored, privately-owned, and managed enterprises. Instead, they are government-owned and government-controlled agencies. Nothing is clearer than that the taxpayers are on the hook for all their debt and risk, and that government officers are fully in command. They are just parts of the government now and should be accounted for accordingly.

The governing “Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 47, Reporting Entity,” defines the criteria to decide between a “consolidation entity” included in the government’s consolidated financial statements, and a “disclosure entity” which resides in the footnotes, off-balance sheet. These criteria are whether “as a whole, the organization: a) is financed through taxes and other non-exchange revenues; b) is governed by the Congress or the President; c) imposes or may impose risks and rewards to the government; and d) provides goods and services on a non-market basis.” Note 1 to the US Government Financial Statements adds the view that Fannie and Freddie’s “relationship to the government is not expected to be permanent.”

Taking these in order:

Fannie and Freddie’s financing completely depends on the government.

All of Fannie and Freddie’s revenues and financing depend upon the guarantee of their obligations by the government. Without this guarantee, neither of them could exist for a day. This guarantee means their revenue depends on access to the taxing power of the government. Moreover, the guarantee is provided to them for free, the essence of a non-exchange arrangement. This is a permanent arrangement.

There is no non-government governance of Fannie and Freddie and has not been for more than 17 years.

It is often said that this guarantee is “implicit,” but no informed person doubts that it is real. And everybody is right about this. President Trump, for example, has confirmed the government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie and stated that it will be retained. We feel sure that the reality of this guarantee, essential to Fannie and Freddie’s very existence, is a view shared by the US Treasury, by all Fannie and Freddie’s customers and creditors, and by FASAB, too.

Fannie and Freddie’s equity financing also depends on the government. The government’s stake in their equity is a $367 billion liquidation preference in their combined senior preferred stock. Subtracting this government stake from their total equity of $179 billion would leave them both technically insolvent, with a combined non-government equity of negative $188 billion. On top of this, the government has the right to acquire 79.9 percent of the common stock of both for one-thousandth of a cent per share. This totals to less than $55,000.

Fannie and Freddie are completely controlled by the government.

Fannie and Freddie are entirely subject to their conservator, who is the director of the Federal Housing Finance Board. Under the law, the conservator wields the complete power of their boards of directors and executives as well as being their regulator, and moreover, he has made himself the chairman of both of their subordinate boards. The director of the FHFB is removable by and responsible to the president of the United States. An excellent recent example of Fannie and Freddie’s governance is their instructions from the government to buy $200 billion in mortgage-backed securities. As reported by National Mortgage Professional, “In early January, President Donald Trump said he is ordering his ‘representatives’ [Fannie and Freddie] to buy $200 billion in mortgage bonds to bring down housing costs … FHFA Director Bill Pulte said on X that Fannie and Freddie will execute the purchase.”

There is no non-government governance of Fannie and Freddie, and has not been for more than 17 years.

Fannie and Freddie impose large risks on and offer rewards to the government.

Because it guarantees their $7.6 trillion in obligations, the government remains fully at risk for big losses at Fannie and Freddie, which may occur, just as it did when Fannie and Freddie went broke from bad loans in 2008. The Treasury provided them a $190 billion bailout, buying senior preferred equity that it still owns. Conversely, when Fannie and Freddie have been profitable under current arrangements, the government has benefited by dividends it has received, or by increases in the liquidation preference of its senior preferred shares, in effect, a dividend in kind. Any increase in the value of the Treasury’s option to acquire most of Fannie and Freddie’s common stock for less than $55,000 would also be a reward.

Fannie and Freddie provide financial services on a non-market basis.

Fannie and Freddie operate at extremely high, non-market leverage. Most of their earnings are made possible by their non-market, free guarantee from the government, for which, by the way, neither has ever paid even one cent. We have calculated that if they had to pay a fair rate for their $7.6 trillion of free government guarantee, it would absorb 50 percent to 100 percent of their pre-tax profit. The entire political rationale for Fannie and Freddie’s existence is that they create mortgage financing at interest rates below what the market would offer, possible only because of their deep links to the government, of which they have now become simply a part.

The characteristics that make Fannie and Freddie “consolidation entities” are not temporary, but are long-term or permanent. Having the government guaranty, being financially dependent on the government, imposing large risks on the government, and operating on a non-market basis are all permanent parts of Fannie and Freddie. Being mostly owned by and completely controlled by the government is not temporary, since it has been going on for 17 years, and the situation has outlasted many attempts at legislative reforms or attempted so-called “privatizations.” There appears to be a strong probability that the current situation will simply continue. President Trump has said as much: “I will stay strong in my position on overseeing them as President.”

Considering all these elements as a whole, we conclude that Fannie and Freddie should be consolidated in the US government’s financial statements. As a result, the proper consolidated total of government debt is $7.6 trillion greater than officially reported.